Bank Executives’ Outside Directorships and Career Outcomes

46 Pages Posted: 3 Jul 2016

See all articles by Thomas K. Kick

Thomas K. Kick

Deutsche Bundesbank

William L. Megginson

University of Oklahoma

Andrea Schertler

University of Graz

Date Written: June 30, 2016


We employ a unique sample of 5000 outside directorships held by German executive bank directors over 1993-2015 to examine whether these directorships proxy reputational capital and/or bankers’ private information. We exploit various circumstances of executive directors’ appointments and bank performance with bank-fixed-effect and difference-in-differences estimations to show that outside directorships enhance value for the bank and improve executives’ career outcomes, mostly because these posts signal good managerial ability and access to valuable private information about clients. Overall, our results suggest that bankers’ outside directorships have a dual role in the German corporate governance system.

Keywords: executive directors, outside directorships, appointments, bank performance

JEL Classification: G21, G34, M12

Suggested Citation

Kick, Thomas K. and Megginson, William L. and Schertler, Andrea, Bank Executives’ Outside Directorships and Career Outcomes (June 30, 2016). Available at SSRN: or

Thomas K. Kick

Deutsche Bundesbank ( email )

Wilhelm-Epstein-Str. 14
Frankfurt/Main, 60431

William L. Megginson (Contact Author)

University of Oklahoma ( email )

307 W Brooks, 205A Adams Hall
Norman, OK 73019
United States
(405) 325-2058 (Phone)
(405) 325-1957 (Fax)


Andrea Schertler

University of Graz ( email )

Universitaetsstrasse 15 / FE
A-8010 Graz, 8010

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