Slightly Biased Communication

32 Pages Posted: 3 Jul 2016

Date Written: June 20, 2016

Abstract

This paper analyzes strategic information transmission between a sender and a receiver when their conflict of interest is small. In this instance, communication is precise: each message communicates a small mass of states of the world. Equilibrium strategies can be approximated by simple differential equations which allow a neat visualization of how the payoff structure shapes communication. In particular, we characterize how the distribution of states influences the precision of the information transmission, the effect of limiting the set of available messages, and which changes in the (state-dependent) bias improve communication.

Keywords: Strategic Communication, Small Bias

JEL Classification: C72, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Dilme, Francesc, Slightly Biased Communication (June 20, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2803065 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2803065

Francesc Dilme (Contact Author)

University of Bonn ( email )

Lennestrasse 35
53113 Bonn
Germany
0049228737957 (Phone)

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