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Bribery: Greed versus Reciprocity

91 Pages Posted: 4 Jul 2016  

Uri Gneezy

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management

Silvia Saccardo

Carnegie Mellon University, Department of Social and Decision Sciences

Roel van Veldhuizen

WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Date Written: December 3, 2015

Abstract

It is estimated that a trillion dollars are annually exchanged in bribes, distorting justice and economic efficiency. In a novel experiment, we investigate the drivers of bribery. Two participants compete for a prize; a referee picks the winner. Participants can bribe the referee. When the referee can keep only the winner’s bribe, bribes distort her judgment. When the referee keeps the bribes regardless of the winner, bribes no longer influence her judgment. An extra-laboratory experiment in an Indian market confirms these results. Hence, our participants are influenced by bribes out of greed, and not because of a desire to reciprocate.

Keywords: Bribery, Reciprocity, Laboratory Experiment, Extra-Laboratory experiment

JEL Classification: D73, C91, K42

Suggested Citation

Gneezy, Uri and Saccardo, Silvia and van Veldhuizen, Roel, Bribery: Greed versus Reciprocity (December 3, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2803623 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2803623

Uri Gneezy

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
Rady School of Management
La Jolla, CA 92093
United States

Silvia Saccardo (Contact Author)

Carnegie Mellon University, Department of Social and Decision Sciences ( email )

Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States

Roel Van Veldhuizen

WZB Berlin Social Science Center ( email )

Reichpietschufer 50
D-10785 Berlin, 10785
Germany

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