Arbitrator Selection – Towards Greater State Control

Kulick, Andreas (ed), Reassertion of Control over the Investment Treaty Regime (Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming)

University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 30/2016

22 Pages Posted: 9 Jul 2016

See all articles by Michael Waibel

Michael Waibel

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law; Lauterpacht Centre for International Law; University of Cambridge - Jesus College

Date Written: July 8, 2016

Abstract

Two defining characteristics of international arbitration are the absence of a standing tribunal and the selection of the adjudicators by the disputing parties. Investment arbitral tribunals are constituted for particular cases with decision-makers appointed for one particular dispute only by the disputing parties directly, or in accordance with their agreement. This chapter focuses on the formal and informal rules for nominating arbitrators, how the parties and arbitral institutions choose arbitrators in practice, the patterns of arbitral appointment that these rules produce, and possible avenues for reform. The main question is how parties and arbitral institutions select arbitrators to serve on arbitral tribunals.

Keywords: international arbitration; arbitrators; selection; appointment; legitimacy

JEL Classification: K33, K41

Suggested Citation

Waibel, Michael, Arbitrator Selection – Towards Greater State Control (July 8, 2016). Kulick, Andreas (ed), Reassertion of Control over the Investment Treaty Regime (Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming); University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 30/2016. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2807015 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2807015

Michael Waibel (Contact Author)

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Law ( email )

10 West Road
Cambridge, CB3 9DZ
United Kingdom

Lauterpacht Centre for International Law ( email )

5 Cranmer Road
Cambridge, CB3 9BL
United Kingdom

University of Cambridge - Jesus College ( email )

Jesus Lane
Cambridge, CB5 8BL
United Kingdom

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