Learning from the Swiss Corporate Governance Exception
Forthcoming on Kyklos
19 Pages Posted: 11 Jul 2016
Date Written: July 11, 2016
The Swiss economy represents an exception to the legal origin theory (e.g., Roe (2006)). Although Switzerland is a country belonging to the civil law family, many of its public companies have diffused corporate ownership, as do those in common law countries. This paper maintains that the Swiss exception relies on the complementarity between corporate ownership and policies addressing employment protection and innovation. The Swiss case presents two lessons: first, the current corporate governance is the result of a long and composite path in which politics plays a pivotal role; second, the institutional differences and similarities across countries, which one would try to explain along with the legal origin theory, can derive diversely from additional politics-based accounts, such as those referring to policies on employment protection and innovation.
Keywords: Corporate governance and ownership, innovation, employment protection, institutional complementarity, Swiss economy
JEL Classification: G30, J50, 016, P16
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation