Just Say 'No' to Logical Negativism
in Karl Raimund Popper: Une épistémologie sans visage et sans rivage, ed. Marcel Nguimbi, Cahiers Epistemo-Logiques 4, no.1 (2016): 33-54
23 Pages Posted: 15 Jul 2016
Date Written: April 2016
Karl Popper’s influential philosophy of science had the enthusiastic support of well-known scientists, and has even played a significant role in the U.S. legal system. Assessing the true value of Popper’s contribution to our understanding of science is complicated by the fact that, besides the authentic, uncompromisingly falsificationist Popper, there is also a shadow Popper who offers more modest, and more plausible, ideas. But the authentic Popper’s original and distinctive claims about science are indefensible; and the shadow Popper’s more defensible ideas are not original. The Critical Common-sensist approach developed in my Defending Science — Within Reason resolves the difficulties of Popper’s Logical Negativism, and provides a much more plausible account of the scientific enterprise.
Keywords: science, Popper, falsificationism, deductivism, verisimilitude, skepticism, Peirce, Whewell, Critical Common-sensism
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