Dynasties and the Political Budget Cycle

74 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2016

See all articles by Gianmarco Daniele

Gianmarco Daniele

University of Milan - Faculty of Law; Bocconi University

Paul Vertier

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 12, 2016


In this paper, we provide a wide set of results which point toward a better understanding of the role of political dynasties in representative democracies. Our empirical analysis focuses on local politics in Italy, using a large sample of mayors and mayoral candidates in the period 1998-2012. We highlight the relevance of dynasties in the political arena, in terms of electoral performances and self-perpetuation. However, our main contribution is a test of whether dynastic politicians enforce different policies. Based on three different specifications (panel fixed-effects, standard regression discontinuity design on close elections and propensity-score matching), we find no effect of dynastic mayors on average spending, revenues and transfers. Conversely, we show that dynastic mayors increase spending and obtain higher transfers during the year prior to election, especially when they can run for re-election. We then discuss the mechanisms which might explain such strategic behavior.

Keywords: political dynasties, political budget cycle

JEL Classification: H11, D72

Suggested Citation

Daniele, Gianmarco and Vertier, Paul, Dynasties and the Political Budget Cycle (July 12, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808417 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2808417

Gianmarco Daniele (Contact Author)

University of Milan - Faculty of Law ( email )

Via Festa del Perdono, 7
20122 Milano

Bocconi University ( email )

Via Sarfatti 25
Milan, MI 20136

Paul Vertier

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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