Misconduct and Leader Behaviour in Contests – New Evidence from European Football

MAGKS Discussion Paper Series in Economics, No. 29-2016

25 Pages Posted: 13 Jul 2016 Last revised: 17 Jan 2020

See all articles by Karol Kempa

Karol Kempa

Frankfurt School of Finance & Management

Hannes Rusch

Peter Löscher Chair of Business Ethics; Behavioral and Institutional Economics

Date Written: March 1, 2018

Abstract

This paper provides an empirical investigation of severe misconducts in contests based on data from European football championships. We extend previous studies by differentiating between two types of misconducts both resulting in a yellow card, namely dissents with the referee and other misconducts. Confirming the existing literature, we find that teams with lower ability are more likely to commit sabotage, i.e. fouls, to reduce the opponent's chances for success. Sabotage is also more likely when the outcome of the contests is still open. In addition, we find that dissents with the referee are significantly more likely in the case of an unfavourable score. We introduce a new perspective to the study of football data by distinguishing misconducts of team captains from those of other players. We find that captains engage more in sabotage during important matches and challenge referees' decisions in direct reaction to sanctions awarded to teammates. In contrast to regular players, however, captains do not participate in the escalation of series of retaliative misconducts. Finally, our analyses indicate that all types of misconduct have a negative effect on the likelihood of success.

Keywords: Contest, Dissent, Leadership, Sabotage, Football

JEL Classification: D74, D91, M54, Z22.

Suggested Citation

Kempa, Karol and Rusch, Hannes, Misconduct and Leader Behaviour in Contests – New Evidence from European Football (March 1, 2018). MAGKS Discussion Paper Series in Economics, No. 29-2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808539 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2808539

Karol Kempa (Contact Author)

Frankfurt School of Finance & Management ( email )

Adickesallee 32-34
Frankfurt am Main, 60322
Germany

Hannes Rusch

Peter Löscher Chair of Business Ethics ( email )

Arcisstrasse 21
Munich, DE 80333
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.businessethics.edu.tum.de

Behavioral and Institutional Economics ( email )

Licher Strasse 66
Giessen, 35394
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://wiwi.uni-giessen.de

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