The Employment Effects of Faster Payment: Evidence from the Federal Quickpay Reform

75 Pages Posted: 18 Jul 2016 Last revised: 30 Jul 2018

See all articles by Jean-Noel Barrot

Jean-Noel Barrot

HEC Paris; HEC Paris

Ramana Nanda

Imperial College Business School; Harvard University - Entrepreneurial Management Unit

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 30, 2018

Abstract

We study the impact of Quickpay, a federal reform that indefinitely accelerated payments to small business contractors of the U.S. government. We find a strong direct effect of the reform on employment growth at the firm-level. Importantly, how-ever, we also document substantial crowding out of non-treated firms' employment within local labor markets. While the overall net employment effect was positive, it was close to zero in tight labor markets – where crowding out was stronger. Our results highlight an important channel for alleviating financing constraints in small firms, but also emphasize the general-equilibrium effects of large-scale interventions, which can lead to lower aggregate outcomes depending on labor market conditions.

Suggested Citation

Barrot, Jean-Noel and Barrot, Jean-Noel and Nanda, Ramana, The Employment Effects of Faster Payment: Evidence from the Federal Quickpay Reform (July 30, 2018). Harvard Business School Entrepreneurial Management Working Paper No. 17-004, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2808666 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2808666

Jean-Noel Barrot

HEC Paris ( email )

1 rue de la Liberation
Jouy-en-Josas Cedex, 78351
France

HEC Paris ( email )

1 rue de la Liberation
Jouy-en-Josas Cedex, 78351
France

Ramana Nanda (Contact Author)

Imperial College Business School ( email )

South Kensington Campus
Exhibition Road
London SW7 2AZ, SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom

Harvard University - Entrepreneurial Management Unit ( email )

Boston, MA 02163
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.people.hbs.edu/rnanda

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