Interlocking Directorates and Anti-Competitive Risks: An Enforcement Gap in Europe?

Concurrences N° 1-2016

14 Pages Posted: 13 Jul 2016 Last revised: 19 Jul 2016

See all articles by Florence Thépot

Florence Thépot

University of Glasgow; Droit & Croissance (Rules for Growth)

Florian Hugon

Droit & Croissance (Rules for Growth)

Mathieu Luinaud

Droit & Croissance (Rules for Growth)

Date Written: February 15, 2016

Abstract

Interlocking directorates between competitors may raise significant anti-competitive risks, which attract little attention in comparison to that posed by other structural links, such as minority shareholdings. This article provides a systematic analysis of the ability of current legal tools of competition law, as well as of company law and corporate governance to address those anti-competitive risks, and thereby, highlights the existence of an enforcement gap in Europe.

Keywords: Competition law, Antitrust, Corporate Governance, Corporate Law, Company Law

JEL Classification: K21, K22

Suggested Citation

Thépot, Florence and Hugon, Florian and Luinaud, Mathieu, Interlocking Directorates and Anti-Competitive Risks: An Enforcement Gap in Europe? (February 15, 2016). Concurrences N° 1-2016 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2809099

Florence Thépot (Contact Author)

University of Glasgow ( email )

5-9 The Square
University of Glasgow
Glasgow, G12 8QQ
United Kingdom

Droit & Croissance (Rules for Growth) ( email )

c/o Institut Louis Bachelier
29 place de la Bourse
Paris, 75002
France

Florian Hugon

Droit & Croissance (Rules for Growth) ( email )

c/o Institut Louis Bachelier
29 place de la Bourse
Paris, 75002
France

Mathieu Luinaud

Droit & Croissance (Rules for Growth) ( email )

c/o Institut Louis Bachelier
29 place de la Bourse
Paris, 75002
France

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