Manipulability in Constrained School Choice

41 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2016 Last revised: 8 Nov 2018

See all articles by Benoit Decerf

Benoit Decerf

Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Martin Van der Linden

Utah State University - Department of Economics and Finance

Date Written: January 26, 2018

Abstract

In school choice problems, we provide an in-depth analysis of the manipulability of the constrained deferred acceptance (DA) and Boston (BOS) mechanisms. We characterize dominant strategies in both mechanisms and show that constrained DA is less manipulable than constrained BOS in the sense of Arribillaga and Mass ́o (2015). We argue that, from a manipulability perspective, tie-breakers should be revealed before preferences are reported.

Keywords: School choice, Dominant strategy, Undominated strategy, Manipulability, Stability, Tie-breaking, Boston mechanism, Deferred acceptance mechanism.

JEL Classification: C78, D47, D82, I 20

Suggested Citation

Decerf, Benoit and Van der Linden, Martin, Manipulability in Constrained School Choice (January 26, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2809566 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2809566

Benoit Decerf

Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) ( email )

34 Voie du Roman Pays
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, b-1348
Belgium

Martin Van der Linden (Contact Author)

Utah State University - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Logan, UT 84322-1400
United States

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