Manipulability in School Choice

42 Pages Posted: 14 Jul 2016 Last revised: 14 May 2020

See all articles by Benoit Decerf

Benoit Decerf

Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Martin Van der Linden

Emory University

Date Written: January 26, 2018

Abstract

We compare the manipulability of school choice mechanisms based on the occurrence of dominant strategies. We characterize dominant strategies in the constrained versions of the deferred acceptance (DA) and Boston (BOS) mechanisms. We leverage our characterizations to show that dominant strategies occur more often in constrained DA than in constrained BOS and that these differences can be quantitatively sizable. Dominant strategies also become more frequent in constrained DA as students are allowed to report more schools. Although our focus is on constrained mechanisms, we provide dominant strategies comparisons for other mechanisms as well, including application-rejection mechanisms and mechanisms that Pareto dominate DA.

Keywords: School choice, Dominant strategy, Undominated strategy, Manipulability, Stability, Tie-breaking, Boston mechanism, Deferred acceptance mechanism.

JEL Classification: C78, D47, D82, I 20

Suggested Citation

Decerf, Benoit and Van der Linden, Martin, Manipulability in School Choice (January 26, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2809566 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2809566

Benoit Decerf

Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) ( email )

34 Voie du Roman Pays
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, b-1348
Belgium

Martin Van der Linden (Contact Author)

Emory University ( email )

201 Dowman Drive
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States

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