Internet Appendix to 'Regulatory Competition and the Market for Corporate Law'

18 Pages Posted: 21 Jul 2016 Last revised: 17 Dec 2016

Ofer Eldar

Duke University School of Law; Duke Innovation & Entrepreneurship Initiative

Lorenzo Magnolfi

University of Wisconsin-Madison

Date Written: December 14, 2016

Abstract

This appendix to Eldar & Magnolfi (2016) provides additional description of the data, a detailed legal analysis of the legal indices and their construction, and robustness results comparing the inertia model to alternative models that do not include the inertia element.

Keywords: Regulatory competition, corporate governance, anti-takeover statutes, directors and officers liability, Delaware, Nevada, discrete choice models, inertia

JEL Classification: G34, K22, L00, G28

Suggested Citation

Eldar, Ofer and Magnolfi, Lorenzo, Internet Appendix to 'Regulatory Competition and the Market for Corporate Law' (December 14, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2810566

Ofer Eldar (Contact Author)

Duke University School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States

Duke Innovation & Entrepreneurship Initiative ( email )

215 Morris St., Suite 300
Durham, NC 27701
United States

Lorenzo Magnolfi

University of Wisconsin-Madison ( email )

1180 Observatory Drive
Madison, WI Wisconsin 53706
United States
6082628789 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://lorenzomagnolfi.com

Paper statistics

Downloads
46
Abstract Views
201