Regulator Accountability

International Financial Law Review, May 2009

University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2016/021

6 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2016 Last revised: 24 Aug 2016

See all articles by Syren Johnstone

Syren Johnstone

Department of Law, University of Hong Kong; Asian Institute of International Financial Law

Antonio M. Da Roza

The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Law; Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong

Berry Fong Chung Hsu

Asian Institute of International Financial Law

Date Written: May 1, 2009

Abstract

Debate over the collapsed Lehman Brothers minibonds in Hong Kong has triggered discussion on regulatory architecture and whether more regulation is needed. This paper discusses whether an accountability review of regulators' performance is also required.

Keywords: regulatory architecture, regulator accountability, minibonds, lehman brothers, investor protection

Suggested Citation

Johnstone, Syren and Da Roza, Antonio M. and Hsu, Berry Fong Chung, Regulator Accountability (May 1, 2009). International Financial Law Review, May 2009; University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2016/021. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811009

Syren Johnstone (Contact Author)

Department of Law, University of Hong Kong ( email )

Faculty of Law, Pokfulam Road
Pokfulam
Hong Kong
Hong Kong

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.hku.hk/faculty/staff/syren_johnstone.php

Asian Institute of International Financial Law ( email )

Faculty of Law, Pokfulam Road
Pokfulam
Hong Kong
Hong Kong

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.hku.hk/faculty/staff/syren_johnstone.php

Antonio M. Da Roza

The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Law ( email )

Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong, Hong Kong
China

Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong ( email )

Hong Kong

Berry Fong Chung Hsu

Asian Institute of International Financial Law ( email )

Faculty of Law
University of Hong Kong
Hong Kong, 709
China

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