Innovation, Pricing and Targeting in Networks

58 Pages Posted: 25 Jul 2016

See all articles by Fabrizio Panebianco

Fabrizio Panebianco

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS); Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS)

Thierry Verdier

Paris School of Economics (PSE); Delta - Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Yves Zenou

Monash University - Department of Economics; Stockholm University; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: July 2016

Abstract

Consider a network of firms where a firm T is given the opportunity to innovate a product (first-generation innovation). If successful, this firm can temporarily sell this innovation to her direct neighbors because this will give her access to a larger market. However, if her direct neighbors innovate themselves on top of firm T's innovation (second-generation innovations), then firm T loses the right to sell her initial innovation to the remaining firms in the market. We analyze this game where each firm (T and her direct neighbors) has to decide at which price they want to sell their innovation. We show that the optimal price policy of each firm depends on the level of property rights protection, the position of firm T in the network, her degree and the size of the market. We then analyze the welfare implications of our model where the planner that maximizes total welfare has to decide which firm to target. We show that it depends on the level of property rights protection and on the network structure in a non-trivial way.

Keywords: diffusion centrality, innovation., Networks, targets

JEL Classification: D85, L1, Z13

Suggested Citation

Panebianco, Fabrizio and Verdier, Thierry and Zenou, Yves, Innovation, Pricing and Targeting in Networks (July 2016). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11398. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2814073

Fabrizio Panebianco (Contact Author)

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milano, 20126
Italy

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milan, 20126
Italy

Thierry Verdier

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014
France

Delta - Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS) ( email )

48, Boulevard Jourdan
75014 Paris
France
+33 1 4313 6308 (Phone)
+33 1 4313 6310 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Yves Zenou

Monash University - Department of Economics ( email )

Australia

Stockholm University ( email )

Universitetsvägen 10
Stockholm, Stockholm SE-106 91
Sweden

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI) ( email )

P.O. Box 5501
S-114 85 Stockholm
Sweden

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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