Transparency and Opaqueness in the Chinese ICT Sector: A Critique of Chinese and International Corporate Governance Norms

Asian Journal of Comparative Law, Forthcoming

53 Pages Posted: 27 Jul 2016

See all articles by Colin Hawes

Colin Hawes

University of Technology Sydney, Faculty of Law

Grace Li

University of Technology Sydney, Faculty of Law

Date Written: March 1, 2016

Abstract

This paper critiques the current Chinese corporate governance framework and the OECD Corporate Governance Principles on which the Chinese framework is largely based through detailed analysis of public disclosures by four prominent Chinese internet and communications technology (ICT) firms. These include State-controlled firms (China Telecom & China Mobile), mixed ownership (ZTE), and privately-controlled firms (Huawei Technologies). The paper argues that neither Chinese nor international corporate governance norms deal adequately with the complex group structures that are so common among large Chinese firms. It also reveals deficiencies in the rules on independent directors, supervisory committees, and Chinese Communist Party committees as they are applied by Chinese ICT firms. The paper concludes with reform proposals that would provide more useful information and better protection to outside investors and public stakeholders in the unique Chinese corporate environment.

Keywords: Chinese corporate governance, corporate governance, transparency, ICT, telecommunications, ownership

Suggested Citation

Hawes, Colin S. and Li, Grace, Transparency and Opaqueness in the Chinese ICT Sector: A Critique of Chinese and International Corporate Governance Norms (March 1, 2016). Asian Journal of Comparative Law, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2814781 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2814781

Colin S. Hawes

University of Technology Sydney, Faculty of Law ( email )

Sydney
Australia

Grace Li (Contact Author)

University of Technology Sydney, Faculty of Law ( email )

Sydney
Australia

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