Monetary Policy Committees, Voting Behavior and Ideal Points

12 Pages Posted: 30 Jul 2016

See all articles by Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger

Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger

Tilburg University (CentER) - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Ronald Mahieu

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research, Econometrics and Finance Group; TiasNimbas Business School

Louis Raes

Tilburg University; Tilburg University - European Banking Center

Date Written: July 2016

Abstract

While not obvious at first sight, in many modern economies, the position of a monetary authority is similar to the position of the highest-level court (Goodhart (2002)). For example, both bodies are expected to operate independently even though there are crosscountry differences in what independence entails. In the United Kingdom, the highest court is the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords (in short: Law Lords). There is a consensus among legal scholars that the powers of Law Lords with respect to the legislature are less wide ranging in the United Kingdom than the United States’ counterpart, the supreme court (Goodhart and Meade (2004), p.11). In economic jargon one says that the Supreme Court has goal independence whereas the Law Lords have instrument independence.

Suggested Citation

Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W. and Mahieu, Ronald J. and Raes, Louis, Monetary Policy Committees, Voting Behavior and Ideal Points (July 2016). BAFFI CAREFIN Centre Research Paper No. 2016-28. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2815818 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2815818

Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger (Contact Author)

Tilburg University (CentER) - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2411 (Phone)
+31 13 466 3042 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Ronald J. Mahieu

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research, Econometrics and Finance Group ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2430 (Phone)
+31 13 466 3280 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://center.uvt.nl/staff/mahieu/

TiasNimbas Business School ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, North-Brabant 5071HS
Netherlands

Louis Raes

Tilburg University ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, DC 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg University - European Banking Center ( email )

PO Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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