The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty? Evidence from British Commutations During World War I

140 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2016 Last revised: 13 May 2017

See all articles by Daniel L. Chen

Daniel L. Chen

Directeur de Recherche, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Toulouse School of Economics, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, University of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France

Date Written: July 30, 2016

Abstract

During World War I, the British military condemned over 3,000 soldiers to death, but only executed 12%; the others received commuted sentences. Many historians believe that the military command confirmed or commuted sentences for reasons unrelated to the circumstances of a particular case and that the application of the death penalty was essentially a random, “pitiless lottery.” Using a dataset on all capital cases during World War I, I statistically investigate this claim and find that the data are consistent with an essentially random process. Using this result, I exploit variation in commutations and executions within military units to identify the deterrent effect of executions, with deterrence measured by the elapsed time within a unit between the resolution of a death sentence (i.e., a commutation or execution) and subsequent absences within that unit. Absences are measured via handwritten trial records and “wanted” lists prepared by British military police units searching for deserters and preserved in war diaries and police gazettes. I find some limited evidence that executing deserters deterred absences, while executing Irish soldiers, regardless of the crime, spurred absences, particularly Irish absences. I present a model where perceived legitimacy of authority affects why people obey the law.

Keywords: Compliance, Legitimacy, Deterrence

JEL Classification: N44, K14, K42, P48

Suggested Citation

Chen, Daniel L., The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty? Evidence from British Commutations During World War I (July 30, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816255 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2816255

Daniel L. Chen (Contact Author)

Directeur de Recherche, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Toulouse School of Economics, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, University of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France ( email )

21 allée de Brienne
31015 Toulouse cedex 6 France
Toulouse, 31015
France

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