Price-Controls in Jewish Law

53 Pages Posted: 7 Aug 2016 Last revised: 20 Mar 2017

See all articles by Michael Makovi

Michael Makovi

Texas Tech University, College of Agricultural Sciences and Natural Resources, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics; Texas Tech University - Free Market Institute

Date Written: March 19, 2017

Abstract

Economists generally agree that price controls are almost always self-defeating, generally producing undesirable, perverse consequences and failing to accomplish their intentions. Previous scholarship has explored whether the halakhah (Jewish law) of ona'ah (fraud) constitutes a price control. However, less attention has been paid to the similar law of hayyei nefesh (essential foodstuffs) – also known as hafka'at she'arim (profiteering). Neither has criticism been directed towards arbitrary price controls imposed by the corporate, democratic Jewish community, nor to the Talmud's restrictions of speculation and middlemen. This essay argues that while the law of ona'ah is not a price control, the hayyei nefesh/hafka'at she'arim ordinance is one. Economic theory demonstrates that like all price controls, the hayyei nefesh/hafka'at she'arim law, corporate communal price controls, and restrictions on speculation and middlemen are all self-defeating because the means conflict with the ends sought. The conflict between religion and science is therefore not limited to cosmology and biology, but may include economics as well.

Keywords: price controls, price fixing, just price, Jewish business ethics, religious economics

JEL Classification: A12, B11, D00, K20, P00, Z12

Suggested Citation

Makovi, Michael, Price-Controls in Jewish Law (March 19, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2817197 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2817197

Michael Makovi (Contact Author)

Texas Tech University, College of Agricultural Sciences and Natural Resources, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics ( email )

Box 42132
Lubbock, TX 79409-2132
United States

Texas Tech University - Free Market Institute ( email )

Box 45059
Lubbock, TX 79409-5059
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
104
Abstract Views
1,022
rank
265,883
PlumX Metrics