Takings, Fiscal Illusion, and the Median Voter

Forthcoming in 173 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 173(1) (2017)

USC CLASS Research Papers Series No. CLASS16-21

USC Legal Studies Research Papers Series No. 16-23

6 Pages Posted: 3 Aug 2016

See all articles by Daniel M. Klerman

Daniel M. Klerman

University of Southern California Gould School of Law

Date Written: August 2, 2016

Abstract

Schweizer (2017) provides a powerful and general way of using compensation payments to induce efficient actions. Its application to takings under fiscal illusion, however, is problematic. A better model would assume that the government decides to take property by considering effects on the median voter. Under that assumption, payments based on the market value of land, assuming non-excessive investment, induce efficient action by both landowners and the government.

Suggested Citation

Klerman, Daniel M., Takings, Fiscal Illusion, and the Median Voter (August 2, 2016). Forthcoming in 173 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 173(1) (2017); USC CLASS Research Papers Series No. CLASS16-21; USC Legal Studies Research Papers Series No. 16-23. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2817467

Daniel M. Klerman (Contact Author)

University of Southern California Gould School of Law ( email )

699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
213-740-7973 (Phone)
213-740-5502 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://weblaw.usc.edu/contact/contactInfo.cfm?detailID=227

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