Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2818494
 


 



Property Is Another Name for Monopoly Facilitating Efficient Bargaining with Partial Common Ownership of Spectrum, Corporations, and Land


Eric A. Posner


University of Chicago - Law School

E. Glen Weyl


Microsoft Research New York City; Yale University

August 2, 2016

University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 772
Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 555

Abstract:     
The existing system of private property interferes with allocative efficiency by giving owners the power to hold out for excessive prices. We propose a remedy in the form of a tax on property, based on the value self-assessed by its owner at intervals, along with a requirement that the owner sell the property to any third party willing to pay a price equal to the self-assessed value. The tax rate would reflect a tradeoff between gains from allocative efficiency and losses to investment efficiency, and would increase in line with expected developments in information technology. The legal and economic implications of this system are explored.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 60

Keywords: Property, Common Ownership, Investment Incentives, Allocative Efficiency, Spectrum, Domain Names

JEL Classification: B51, C78, D42, D61, D82, K11


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Date posted: August 5, 2016 ; Last revised: August 17, 2016

Suggested Citation

Posner, Eric A. and Weyl, E. Glen, Property Is Another Name for Monopoly Facilitating Efficient Bargaining with Partial Common Ownership of Spectrum, Corporations, and Land (August 2, 2016). University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 772; Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 555. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2818494 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2818494

Contact Information

Eric A. Posner
University of Chicago - Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-0425 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-e/

Eric Glen Weyl (Contact Author)
Microsoft Research New York City ( email )
641 Avenue of the Americas, 7th Floor
New York, NY 10011
United States
(857) 998-4513 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.glenweyl.com
Yale University ( email )
28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States
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