The Measurement of the Independence of Telecommunications Regulatory Agencies in Latin America

Posted: 6 Aug 2016

See all articles by Miguel A. Montoya

Miguel A. Montoya

Instituto Tecnológico de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey

Francesc Trillas

Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Economics; University of Navarra - IESE Business School

Date Written: October 16, 2007

Abstract

In this paper, we apply several alternative methods previously used in the literature to measure the degree of regulatory independence fortelecommunications regulators. These alternative methods are applied to a new homogeneous data set for 23 Latin American countries overa 15-year period. We provide a metric to quantify the degree to which each country creates legally independent regulatory agencies in telecom-munications. All the methods used provide similar results. When the indices are used in econometric equations for fixed line penetration rates,higher levels of de jure regulatory independence appear to have a positive impact on network penetration.

Keywords: Telecommunications; Regulation; Independence; Institutions; Strategic delegation

JEL Classification: L51; L96

Suggested Citation

Montoya, Miguel A. and Trillas Jané, Francesc, The Measurement of the Independence of Telecommunications Regulatory Agencies in Latin America (October 16, 2007). Utilities Policy, Vol. 15, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2818571

Miguel A. Montoya (Contact Author)

Instituto Tecnológico de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey ( email )

Av. General Ramón Corona No.2514
Zapopan, Jalisco, 45201
Mexico
523336693000 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.itesm.mx/wps/wcm/connect/Campus/GDA/Guadalajara/

Francesc Trillas Jané

Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Economics ( email )

Avda. Diagonal 690
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

University of Navarra - IESE Business School

Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

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