Impossibilities for Strategy-Proof Committee Selection Mechanisms with Vetoes

29 Pages Posted: 10 Aug 2016 Last revised: 21 Oct 2017

Date Written: March 14, 2017

Abstract

When a group of voters selects a committee out of a set of candidates, it is common and often desirable to endow these voters with some veto power. I present impossibility results showing that even limited veto power makes many mechanisms of interest manipulable. This applies in particular (i) to mechanisms the range of which contains a degenerate lottery in which a committee is chosen for sure and (ii) to mechanisms that are constructed from extensive game forms with a finite number of strategies. These impossibilities hold on a large set of domains including the domain of additive preferences, and even when probabilistic mechanisms are allowed and voters can report cardinal preferences.

Keywords: Mechanism Design, Strategy-Proofness, Veto, Probabilistic Mechanism, Committee Selection

JEL Classification: C72, D71, D82

Suggested Citation

Van der Linden, Martin, Impossibilities for Strategy-Proof Committee Selection Mechanisms with Vetoes (March 14, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2818678 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2818678

Martin Van der Linden (Contact Author)

Emory University ( email )

201 Dowman Drive
Atlanta, GA 30322
United States

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