How Multilevel Elite Loyalty Strengthens Electoral Authoritarianism: Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections in Russia

37 Pages Posted: 10 Aug 2016 Last revised: 28 Aug 2017

See all articles by Elena Sirotkina

Elena Sirotkina

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Svetlana Karandashova

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Date Written: August 8, 2016

Abstract

Maintain autocratic regimes is widely acknowledged to require elites loyalty. However, loyalty of which elites is more important to establish high voting for an autocrat? Basing on empirical evidence of gubernatorial election in Russia we explore how conflicts between the governor and the elites at municipal and regional levels affect incumbents election outcome. We find that conflicts between governors and the mayors of regional capitals have the only robust negative effect on both electoral result and turnout. Encouraging loyalty of these mayors secures smoother political machinery in the most electorally significant areas of the region (regional capitals) and thus has the most pronounced impact on the outcome of an electoral campaign

Keywords: electoral autocracy, Russian politics, Russian regions, regional politics, gubernatorial election, elites

JEL Classification: Z

Suggested Citation

Sirotkina, Elena and Karandashova, Svetlana, How Multilevel Elite Loyalty Strengthens Electoral Authoritarianism: Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections in Russia (August 8, 2016). Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 36/PS/2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820072 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2820072

Elena Sirotkina (Contact Author)

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

Svetlana Karandashova

National Research University Higher School of Economics ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017
Russia

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
25
Abstract Views
468
PlumX Metrics