The Ambiguity of Force

25 Pages Posted: 9 Aug 2016

See all articles by David Dyzenhaus

David Dyzenhaus

University of Toronto - Faculty of Law/Department of Philosophy

Date Written: September 2016

Abstract

The author argues that Schauer's understanding of appropriate empiricism and relatedly what he wishes to take from the positivist classics might have an even more reductive impact on legal philosophical inquiry than the legal positivist quest (which Schauer rejects) to confine such inquiry to a search for necessary and sufficient conditions. The argument is based on the example of the legal order of the Arab territories occupied by Israel. In the author's view, this legal order is very close to what Schauer regards as the normal case of a properly functioning legal order and in its closeness one can discern the flaws in his argument.

Suggested Citation

Dyzenhaus, David, The Ambiguity of Force (September 2016). Ratio Juris, Vol. 29, Issue 3, pp. 323-347, 2016. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820382 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/raju.12130

David Dyzenhaus (Contact Author)

University of Toronto - Faculty of Law/Department of Philosophy ( email )

78 and 84 Queen's Park
Toronto, Ontario M5S 2C5
Canada
416-978-6935 (Phone)
416-978-2648 (Fax)

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