Can There Be an Artifact Theory of Law?

17 Pages Posted: 9 Aug 2016

See all articles by Luka Burazin

Luka Burazin

University of Zagreb, Faculty of Law

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Date Written: September 2016

Abstract

The idea that particular legal institutions are artifacts is not new. However, the idea that the “law” or “legal system” is itself an artifact has seldom been directly put forward, due perhaps to the ambiguities surrounding philosophical inquiries into law. Nevertheless, such an idea has recently been invoked more often, though not always developed in detail in terms of what the characterization of the “law” or “legal system” as an artifact entails ontologically, and what consequences, if any, this has for philosophical accounts of law. As a result, the primary aim of this paper is to attempt an inquiry into what the claim that “law” by its nature or character is an artifact entails, and what an artifact theory of law might look like.

Suggested Citation

Burazin, Luka, Can There Be an Artifact Theory of Law? (September 2016). Ratio Juris, Vol. 29, Issue 3, pp. 385-401, 2016. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820386 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/raju.12134

Luka Burazin (Contact Author)

University of Zagreb, Faculty of Law ( email )

Trg Republike Hrvatske 14
Zagreb, 10000
Croatia

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