Considering Concessions: A Survey Experiment on the Colombian Peace Process

33 Pages Posted: 14 Aug 2016 Last revised: 14 Jul 2018

See all articles by Aila M. Matanock

Aila M. Matanock

University of California, Berkeley - Charles and Louise Travers Department of Political Science

Natalia Garbiras-Díaz

University of California, Berkeley, Department of Political Science

Date Written: 2015

Abstract

Designing peace agreements that can be signed and sustained can be difficult in civil conflict. Many recent cases of successful settlements include electoral provisions, often for rebel groups to participate as political parties. Engaging the electoral process, however, can also open the peace process to the population at large, potentially derailing a settlement or some of its provisions, perhaps especially those related to political provisions. In this paper, we examine popular support for peace processes, specific political provisions, and potential concessions that provide former rebels with protections, legitimacy, and power. Using a survey experiment in Colombia, we find that the peace process overall is more popular than its electoral provisions and that rebel endorsement of the provisions further diminishes support. These results contribute to an explanation of why the 2016 Colombian plebiscite on the peace agreement failed and to an understanding of how design matters to agreement effectiveness.

Keywords: Colombia, FARC, Peace Process, Post-Conflict Elections, Public Support, Survey Experiment

Suggested Citation

Matanock, Aila M. and Garbiras-Díaz, Natalia, Considering Concessions: A Survey Experiment on the Colombian Peace Process (2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2822599 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2822599

Aila M. Matanock (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Charles and Louise Travers Department of Political Science ( email )

210 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

Natalia Garbiras-Díaz

University of California, Berkeley, Department of Political Science ( email )

210 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

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