Bank Enforcement Actions and the Terms of Lending

62 Pages Posted: 15 Aug 2016

See all articles by Yota Deli

Yota Deli

UCD School of Economics

Manthos D. Delis

Audencia Business School

Iftekhar Hasan

Fordham University ; Bank of Finland; University of Sydney

Liuling Liu

Bowling Green State University - College of Business Administration

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2016

Abstract

Formal enforcement actions issued against banks for violations of laws and regulations related to safety and soundness can theoretically have both positive and negative effects on the terms of lending. Using hand-collected data on such enforcement actions issued against U.S. banks, we show that they have a strong negative effect on price terms (loan spreads and fees) for corporate loans and a positive one on non-price terms (loan maturity, size, covenants, and collateral). The results also indicate that in the absence of enforcement actions, the cost of borrowing during the subprime crisis would have been much higher, while punished banks intensify use of collateral.

Keywords: E44, E51, G21, G28, bank supervision, enforcement actions, syndicated loans, price and non-price terms of lending

Suggested Citation

Deli, Yota and Delis, Manthos D. and Hasan, Iftekhar and Liu, Liuling, Bank Enforcement Actions and the Terms of Lending (2016). Bank of Finland Research Discussion Paper No. 23/2016, Gabelli School of Business, Fordham University Research Paper No. 2822735, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2822735 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2822735

Yota Deli (Contact Author)

UCD School of Economics ( email )

Belfield
Dublin, Dublin Dublin 4
Ireland
Dublin 4 (Fax)

Manthos D. Delis

Audencia Business School ( email )

8 Road Joneliere
BP 31222
Nantes Cedex 3, 44312
France

Iftekhar Hasan

Fordham University ( email )

45 COLUMBUS AVENUE
GBA-5TH FLOOR
NEW YORK, NY 10023
United States

Bank of Finland ( email )

P.O. Box 160
Helsinki 00101
Finland

University of Sydney ( email )

P.O. Box H58
Sydney, NSW 2006
Australia

Liuling Liu

Bowling Green State University - College of Business Administration ( email )

Bowling Green, OH 43403
United States

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