CFO co-option and CEO compensation
Forthcoming in Management Science
Posted: 17 Aug 2016 Last revised: 10 Oct 2019
Date Written: September 19, 2019
We study whether relative power in the CEO-CFO relationship influences CEO compensation. To operationalize relative power of a CEO over a CFO, we define CFO co-option as the appointment of a CFO after a CEO assumes office. We find that CFO co-option is associated with a CEO pay premium of about 10%, which is concentrated more in the early years of the co-opted CFO’s tenure and in components of compensation that vary with the achievement of analyst-based earnings targets. Our evidence also indicates that a primary channel through which CEO power over a co-opted CFO yields the achievement of earnings targets is the use of earnings management to inflate earnings. Co-opted CFOs rely primarily on using discretionary accruals to manage earnings prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley regulatory intervention and switch to real activities manipulation afterwards. The evidence thus suggests that the form of earnings management depends on costs imposed on the CFO to inflate earnings.
Keywords: CFO, CEO, Executive Compensation, Monitoring, Financial Reporting, Managerial Power, Earnings Management
JEL Classification: M41, M52, G30
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation