The Selective Enforcement of Government Regulation: Battleground States and the EPA

49 Pages Posted: 21 Aug 2016 Last revised: 7 Jul 2017

See all articles by Huseyin Gulen

Huseyin Gulen

Purdue University - Krannert School of Management

Brett W. Myers

Texas Tech, Rawls College of Business

Date Written: July 06, 2017

Abstract

The Electoral College creates incentives for politicians and regulators to direct policy favors to "battleground" states, which represent the median voter in presidential elections. We determine whether regulators treat battleground states favorably by examining whether the EPA is less likely to find a regulated facility in violation of the Clean Water Act if it is in a battleground state. We find that violation rates for these facilities are significantly lower than those in non-battleground states. Identification is obtained by the analysis of the violation rates of similar facilities located along the border between battleground and non-battleground states.

Keywords: Regulation, regulatory enforcement, battleground states, swing states, public policy

JEL Classification: G12, G18

Suggested Citation

Gulen, Huseyin and Myers, Brett W., The Selective Enforcement of Government Regulation: Battleground States and the EPA (July 06, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2826741 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2826741

Huseyin Gulen (Contact Author)

Purdue University - Krannert School of Management ( email )

1310 Krannert Building
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States

Brett W. Myers

Texas Tech, Rawls College of Business ( email )

Lubbock, TX 79407
United States

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