Are Low Prices Compromises Collusion Guarantees? An Experimental Analysis of Price Matching Policies

LINEEX Working Paper No. 22/01

30 Pages Posted: 14 Sep 2001

See all articles by Enrique Fatas

Enrique Fatas

University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS); University of Valencia - LINEEX

J. A. Máñez

University of Valencia - Faculty of Economics

Date Written: June 4, 2001

Abstract

In this paper we experimentally test the ability of Price-Matching Guarantees (PMG) to rise prices above the competitive level. We implement three different treatments of symmetric duopolies to check the effect of PMG both as a market institution and as a business strategy. In the absence of any low-price guarantee, prices get close to the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium although in the 50 rounds of the experiment no full convergence is obtained. The existence of PMG as an institution in a market where firms decide only about prices results in a clear collusive outcome as all markets quickly and fully converge to the collusive prediction. If we allow subjects to decide whether they adopt price matching or not we observe that almost all subjects decide to adopt PMG; prices significantly increases over the first treatment observed prices and are very close to the collusive ones.

Keywords: price matching guarantees, experimental economics

JEL Classification: C9, L11

Suggested Citation

Fatas, Enrique and Máñez-Castillejo, Juan A., Are Low Prices Compromises Collusion Guarantees? An Experimental Analysis of Price Matching Policies (June 4, 2001). LINEEX Working Paper No. 22/01. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=283178 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.283178

Enrique Fatas (Contact Author)

University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) ( email )

United Kingdom

University of Valencia - LINEEX ( email )

Campus Tarongers
E-46022 Valencia
Spain
+34.963.828.643 (Phone)
+963.828.415 (Fax)

Juan A. Máñez-Castillejo

University of Valencia - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Valencia, E-46022
Spain

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