Political Ideology and Accounting Regulation in China

Posted: 1 Sep 2016

See all articles by Jason Zezhong Xiao

Jason Zezhong Xiao

Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University

Mahmoud Ezzamel

Cardiff Business School - Accounting and Finance Section

Aixiang Pan

Independent

Date Written: August 30, 2007

Abstract

This paper analyzes the relationship between political ideology and accounting change covering the transition from Maoism to Dengism in China. Under Mao, the ideological principles of class struggle primacy, central planning, and public ownership were mobilized to construct a class view of accounting according to which Western accounting concepts were prohibited because they were considered a tool of capitalist exploitation. Under Deng, the new ideological principles of economic development primacy, marketization, and mixed-ownership paved the way for a different view of accounting to emerge. Accounting was re-presented as a science and a neutral technology with no national boundaries, and the adoption of what were deemed Western accounting concepts, such as conservatism, was encouraged. In both eras, accounting was construed as a malleable object shaped by the force of the dominant political discourse. We show how in each era political ideology created a context that was rendered more or less compatible with the adoption of particular accounting concepts.

Suggested Citation

Xiao, Jason Zezhong and Ezzamel, Mahmoud and Pan, Aixiang, Political Ideology and Accounting Regulation in China (August 30, 2007). Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 32, No. 7/8, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2832434

Jason Zezhong Xiao

Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University ( email )

Aberconway building
Colum Drive
Cardiff, CF10 3EU
United Kingdom

Mahmoud Ezzamel (Contact Author)

Cardiff Business School - Accounting and Finance Section ( email )

Colum Drive
Cardiff CF10 3EU
United Kingdom
+44 (0) 29 2087 4277 (Phone)
+44 (0) 29 2087 4419 (Fax)

Aixiang Pan

Independent ( email )

No Address Available

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
549
PlumX Metrics