Matching Soulmates

40 Pages Posted: 5 Sep 2016 Last revised: 21 Feb 2017

See all articles by Greg Leo

Greg Leo

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics

Jian Lou

Vanderbilt University, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Students

Martin Van der Linden

Utah State University - Department of Economics and Finance

Yevgeniy Vorobeychik

Vanderbilt University, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science

Myrna H. Wooders

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics

Date Written: February 9, 2017

Abstract

We study iterated matching of soulmates [IMS] — the process of matching coalitions that are the favorite for each member (soulmates), coalitions of soulmates in the remaining group, and so on. Coalitions produced by IMS belong to any stable partition and mechanisms that implement IMS give players in these coalitions (or who at least believe they are) no incentive to deviate from truthful preference reporting, even jointly. When everyone is matched by IMS, these mechanisms are stable and have a truthful strong Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we show, using real-world data and simulation, that scenarios in which many people are matched by IMS are common under natural kinds of preferences.

Suggested Citation

Leo, Greg and Lou, Jian and Van der Linden, Martin and Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy and Wooders, Myrna H., Matching Soulmates (February 9, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2833553 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2833553

Greg Leo (Contact Author)

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States

Jian Lou

Vanderbilt University, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Students ( email )

Nashville, TN
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.jian-lou.com

Martin Van der Linden

Utah State University - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Logan, UT 84322-1400
United States

Yevgeniy Vorobeychik

Vanderbilt University, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science ( email )

2301 Vanderbilt Place
Nashville, TN 37240
United States

Myrna H. Wooders

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States

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