Privatization and the Unusual Case of Belarusian Accession to the WTO

75 Pages Posted: 7 Sep 2016 Last revised: 27 Dec 2016

See all articles by Edward J. Balistreri

Edward J. Balistreri

Iowa State University

Zoryana Olekseyuk

Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) - German Development Institute (DIE)

David G. Tarr

International Trade Analysis

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Date Written: December 27, 2016

Abstract

The accession negotiations of Belarus to the WTO are unusual since, due to its obligations in the Eurasian Economic Union, WTO accession is not expected to impact its tariffs or formerly substantial trade distorting agricultural subsidies. Nonetheless, we estimate that WTO accession will increase welfare by 8.8 percent in Belarus. We show that inclusion of (i) foreign direct investment; (ii) reduction on non-discriminatory barriers against services providers; and (iii) our model with imperfect competition and endogenous productivity effects together produce estimated gains eleven times larger than a model of perfect competition with only cross-border trade in services. Our analysis is enabled by our production of a dataset on both discriminatory and non-discriminatory barriers in services and their ad valorem equivalents. Based on a new dataset on labor productivity by sector and type of ownership, in our central model we estimate that privatization will increase welfare by 35.4 percent. We find substantial variance in the estimated gains from privatization depending on model assumptions; but all the estimates of the impacts of privatization indicate substantial welfare gains.

Keywords: privatization, services liberalization, endogenous productivity, foreign direct investment, WTO accession

JEL Classification: D02, D58, F13, F14, L16, C68

Suggested Citation

Balistreri, Edward J. and Olekseyuk, Zoryana and Tarr, David G., Privatization and the Unusual Case of Belarusian Accession to the WTO (December 27, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834330 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2834330

Edward J. Balistreri

Iowa State University ( email )

260 Heady Hall
Ames, IA 50011
United States
3032531674 (Phone)

Zoryana Olekseyuk

Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) - German Development Institute (DIE) ( email )

Tulpenfeld 4
Bonn, 53113
Germany

David G. Tarr (Contact Author)

International Trade Analysis ( email )

7901 Hispanola Avenue
Apt. 1102
North Bay Village, FL 33141
United States
5712242796 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/davidgtarr/

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