Refinements and Higher Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey

Northwestern Center Working Paper No. 1197

24 Pages Posted: 3 Apr 2002

See all articles by Stephen Morris

Stephen Morris

MIT

Atsushi Kajii

Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University; Singapore Management University

Date Written: October 1997

Abstract

This paper presents a simple framework that allows us to survey and relate some different strands of the game theory literature. We describe a "canonical" way of adding incomplete information to a complete information game. This framework allows us to give a simple "complete theory" interpretation (Kreps 1990) of standard normal form refinements such as perfection, and to relate refinements both to the "higher order beliefs literature" (Rubinstein 1989; Monderer and Samet 1989; Morris, Rob and Shin 1995; Kajii and Morris 1997a) and the "payoff uncertainty approach" (Fudenberg, Kreps and Levine 1988; Dekel and Fudenberg 1990).

Keywords: Higher Order Beliefs Refinements

JEL Classification: C8

Suggested Citation

Morris, Stephen Edward and Kajii, Atsushi, Refinements and Higher Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey (October 1997). Northwestern Center Working Paper No. 1197, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=283477 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.283477

Stephen Edward Morris (Contact Author)

MIT ( email )

77 Massachusetts Avenue
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://economics.mit.edu/faculty/semorris

Atsushi Kajii

Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University ( email )

Yoshida-Honmachi
Sakyo-ku
Kyoto 606-8501
JAPAN

HOME PAGE: http://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/~kajii/

Singapore Management University ( email )

School of Economics
90 Stamford Road
Singapore, 178903
Singapore

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