Post-Acquisition Performance of Private Acquirers

64 Pages Posted: 6 Sep 2016 Last revised: 3 Nov 2022

See all articles by Andrey Golubov

Andrey Golubov

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Nan Xiong

Durham University

Date Written: November 25, 2019

Abstract

We provide the first evidence on the performance of private operating firms as acquirers. Private bidders experience greater post-acquisition operating performance improvements compared to public bidders. This effect is not due to differences in target types, merger accounting, financing constraints, private equity ownership or subsequent listing of some private bidders, and is robust to instrumentation. Further analysis of governance arrangements at least partially attributes the private bidder effect to lower agency costs in private firms. Not only do private firms pay lower prices for target firm assets, they also operate them more efficiently by containing overhead costs and capital expenditures.

Keywords: private firms, mergers and acquisitions, operating performance improvements, agency conflicts

JEL Classification: G34

Suggested Citation

Golubov, Andrey and Xiong, Nan, Post-Acquisition Performance of Private Acquirers (November 25, 2019). Journal of Corporate Finance, Forthcoming, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 482/2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834805 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2834805

Andrey Golubov (Contact Author)

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6
Canada

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://https://ecgi.global/users/andrey-golubov

Nan Xiong

Durham University ( email )

Durham, DH1 3LE
Great Britain

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