50 Pages Posted: 6 Sep 2016
Date Written: September 2016
In this article we study second-degree price discrimination by a two-sided monopoly platform. We find novel distortions that arise due to the two-sidedness of the market. They make the standard result "no distortion at top and downward distortion at bottom" not holding. They generate a new type of non-responsiveness, different from the one found by Guesnerie and Laffont (1984). We also show that the platform may mitigate or remove non-responsiveness at one side by properly designing price discrimination on the other side. These findings help to address our central question, i.e., when price discrimination on one side substitutes for or complements price discrimination on the other side. As an application, we study the optimal mechanism design for an advertising platform mediating advertisers and consumers.
Keywords: (second-degree) price discrimination, advertising, non-responsiveness, Two-sided markets, type reversal
JEL Classification: D4, D82, L5, M3
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Jeon, Doh-Shin and Kim, Byung-Cheol and Menicucci, Domenico, Second-Degree Price Discrimination by a Two-Sided Monopoly Platform (September 2016). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11488. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834825
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