Incentives and Teacher Effort

40 Pages Posted: 6 Sep 2016

See all articles by Hai-Anh Dang

Hai-Anh Dang

World Bank - Development Data Group (DECDG); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Indiana University Bloomington - School of Public & Environmental Affairs (SPEA); Global Labor Organization (GLO); Vietnam National University Ha Noi; Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences (VASS) - Centre for Analysis and Forecasting

Elizabeth King

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Date Written: October 2016

Abstract

Few would contest that teachers are a very important determinant of how much students learn in school, and how to improve teacher performance has been the focus of lively policy debate in both rich and poor countries. This paper examines how teacher incentives, both pecuniary and non‐pecuniary, correlate with teacher effort. Using school survey data from Lao PDR, we estimate measures of teacher effort, including the number of hours that teachers spend preparing for classes and teacher provision of private tutoring outside of class hours, which are not the typical measures used in previous research. Estimation results fit well under the standard labour supply framework and indicate that greater teacher effort is associated with non‐pecuniary incentives such as more teacher autonomy over teaching materials and monitoring as measured by the existence of an active parent–teacher association and the ability of school principals to dismiss teachers. Methodologically, this paper provides a detailed derivation of a simultaneous OLS‐probit model with school random effects that can jointly estimate teacher work hours and tutoring provision.

Keywords: Teacher incentives, teacher effort, private tutoring, joint probit‐OLS, school random effects, maximum simulated likelihood, Lao PDR

Suggested Citation

Dang, Hai-Anh H. and King, Elizabeth, Incentives and Teacher Effort (October 2016). Economics of Transition, Vol. 24, Issue 4, pp. 621-660, 2016, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2835167 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecot.12101

Hai-Anh H. Dang (Contact Author)

World Bank - Development Data Group (DECDG) ( email )

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IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

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Indiana University Bloomington - School of Public & Environmental Affairs (SPEA) ( email )

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Vietnam National University Ha Noi ( email )

Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences (VASS) - Centre for Analysis and Forecasting ( email )

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Elizabeth King

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )

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Washington, DC 20433
United States

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