Is Partisan Alignment Electorally Rewarding? Evidence from Village Council Elections in India

Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) Working Paper No 63

53 Pages Posted: 9 Sep 2016

See all articles by Subhasish Dey

Subhasish Dey

University of Manchester

Kunal Sen

University of Manchester

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 1, 2016

Abstract

Do ruling parties positively discriminate in favour of their own constituencies in allocating public resources? If they do, do they gain electorally in engaging in such a practice? This paper tests whether partisan alignment exists in the allocation of funds for India's largest social protection programme, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) in the state of West Bengal, and whether incumbent local governments (village councils) gain electorally in the practice of partisan alignment. Using a quasi-experimental research design, we find that the village council-level ruling party spends significantly more in its own party constituencies than in opponent constituencies. We also find strong evidence of electoral rewards in the practice of partisan alignment. However, we find that the results differ between the two main ruling political parties at the village council level in the state.

Keywords: National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, partisan alignment feedback effect, fuzzy regression, discontinuity design

Suggested Citation

Dey, Subhasish and Sen, Kunal, Is Partisan Alignment Electorally Rewarding? Evidence from Village Council Elections in India (August 1, 2016). Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) Working Paper No 63, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2835536 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2835536

Subhasish Dey (Contact Author)

University of Manchester ( email )

Kunal Sen

University of Manchester ( email )

Oxford Road
Manchester, N/A M13 9PL
United Kingdom

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