Love, Money, and Parental Goods: Does Parental Matchmaking Matter?

47 Pages Posted: 7 Sep 2016

See all articles by Fali Huang

Fali Huang

Singapore Management University - School of Social Sciences

Ginger Zhe Jin

University of Maryland - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Lixin Colin Xu

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Date Written: September 2016

Abstract

While parental matchmaking has been widespread throughout history and across countries, we know little about the relationship between parental matchmaking and marriage outcomes. Does parental involvement in matchmaking help ensure their needs are better taken care of by married children? This paper finds supportive evidence using a survey of Chinese couples. In particular, parental involvement in matchmaking is associated with having a more submissive wife, a greater number of children, a higher likelihood of having any male children, and a stronger belief of the husband in providing old age support to his parents. These benefits, however, are achieved at the cost of less marital harmony within the couple and lower market income of the wife. The results render support to and extend the findings of Becker, Murphy and Spenkuch (2015) where parents meddle with children's preferences to ensure their commitment to providing parental goods such as old age support.

Suggested Citation

Huang, Fali and Jin, Ginger Zhe and Xu, Lixin Colin, Love, Money, and Parental Goods: Does Parental Matchmaking Matter? (September 2016). NBER Working Paper No. w22586. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2835824

Fali Huang (Contact Author)

Singapore Management University - School of Social Sciences ( email )

90 Stamford Road
Singapore, 178903
Singapore
65-68280859 (Phone)
65-68280833 (Fax)

Ginger Zhe Jin

University of Maryland - Department of Economics ( email )

College Park, MD 20742
United States
301-405-3484 (Phone)
301-405-3542 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Lixin Colin Xu

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )

1818 H Street, N.W.
MC 3-427
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-473-4664 (Phone)
202-522-1155 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/cxu

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