Personal Ties, Meritocracy, and China's Anti-Corruption Campaign

62 Pages Posted: 7 Sep 2016 Last revised: 26 Jul 2021

See all articles by Peter L. Lorentzen

Peter L. Lorentzen

University of San Francisco

Xi Lu

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

Date Written: November 21, 2018

Abstract

We investigate the initial phase of China’s anti-corruption campaign under Xi Jinping, finding that arrests are associated with departures from standard promotion practices that rewarded officials for GDP growth performance and elite career paths. Almost no individuals connected to the General Secretary or the Premier were arrested, but connections to the broader Politburo Standing Committee were not protective. Using new data on elite connections revealed by corruption investigations, we confirm the importance of workplace and hometown ties in Chinese politics, and find additional evidence contradicting a narrow power-consolidation view of the crackdown.

Keywords: corruption, meritocracy, personal ties, economic growth

Suggested Citation

Lorentzen, Peter L. and Lu, Xi, Personal Ties, Meritocracy, and China's Anti-Corruption Campaign (November 21, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2835841 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2835841

Peter L. Lorentzen

University of San Francisco ( email )

2130 Fulton Street
San Francisco, CA 94117-1080
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.peterlorentzen.com

Xi Lu (Contact Author)

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy ( email )

Singapore 117591
Singapore

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