Primary Effect in Open-List Elections

VATT Institute for Economic Research Working Papers No. 79

52 Pages Posted: 8 Sep 2016

See all articles by Jaakko Meriläinen

Jaakko Meriläinen

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Centro de Investigacion Economica

Janne Tukiainen

VATT Institute for Economic Research; University of Turku - Turku School of Business - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 7, 2016

Abstract

We study how political parties select political leaders. Using regression discontinuity design and data from Finnish local elections, we find that parties use vote ranks to decide upon promotions. Moreover, we show that this primary effect is higher when competition either between or within parties is lower. We document differences in promotion patterns between parties, the primary effect being stronger in right-wing parties. This result is in line with previous research arguing that right-wing parties prefer more inclusive nomination procedures. Finally, our descriptive analysis suggests that parties weight previous political experience and candidates’ policy positions in their promotion decisions more than voters value these characteristics.

Keywords: Political promotions, Preference votes, Primary effect, Regression discontinuity design

JEL Classification: C210, D720

Suggested Citation

Meriläinen, Jaakko and Tukiainen, Janne, Primary Effect in Open-List Elections (September 7, 2016). VATT Institute for Economic Research Working Papers No. 79, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2835913 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2835913

Jaakko Meriläinen

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Centro de Investigacion Economica ( email )

Av. Camino a Santa Teresa #930
Col. Heroes de Padierna
Mexico City, D.F. 10370
Mexico

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/view/jaakkomerilainen/

Janne Tukiainen (Contact Author)

VATT Institute for Economic Research ( email )

Arkadiankatu 7
P.O Box 1279
Helsinki, FIN-00101
Finland

University of Turku - Turku School of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

Rehtorinpellonkatu 3
Turku, 20014
Finland

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