Auction 97 and the Value of Spectrum

9 Pages Posted: 15 Sep 2016

See all articles by George S. Ford

George S. Ford

Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies

Lawrence J. Spiwak

Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies

Date Written: February 4, 2015

Abstract

Using econometric methods and data from prior spectrum auctions, this paper evaluates the design of the FCC's Auction 97. We find that the elements of the auction's design, including the size of license areas, reduced auction revenues by as much as $21 billion.

Keywords: Spectrum Auctions, Federal Communications Commission, Mobile, Wireless

JEL Classification: L96

Suggested Citation

Ford, George S. and Spiwak, Lawrence J., Auction 97 and the Value of Spectrum (February 4, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2837299 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2837299

George S. Ford (Contact Author)

Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies ( email )

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Lawrence J. Spiwak

Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies ( email )

5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 440
Washington, DC 20015
United States
202-274-0235 (Phone)
202-318-4909 (Fax)

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