Bank Capital and Dividend Externalities

56 Pages Posted: 15 Sep 2016

See all articles by Viral V. Acharya

Viral V. Acharya

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Hanh Le

University of Illinois at Chicago

Hyun Song Shin

Bank for International Settlements (BIS)

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 2016

Abstract

Dividend payouts affect the relative value of claims within a firm. When firms have contingent claims on each other, as in the banking sector, dividend payouts can shift the relative value of stakeholders' claims across firms. Through this channel, one bank's capital policy affects the equity value and risk of default of other banks. In a model where such externalities are strong, bank capital takes on the attribute of a public good, where the private equilibrium features excessive dividends and inefficient recapitalization relative to the efficient policy that maximizes banking sector equity. We compare the implications of the model with observed bank behavior during the crisis of 2007-09.

Keywords: bank dividends, capital erosion, systemic risk

JEL Classification: G01, G21, G24, G28, G32, G35, G38

Suggested Citation

Acharya, Viral V. and Acharya, Viral V. and Le, Hanh and Shin, Hyun Song, Bank Capital and Dividend Externalities (September 2016). BIS Working Paper No. 580, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2838298

Viral V. Acharya (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY NY 10012
United States
2129980354 (Phone)
2129954256 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~vacharya

New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance ( email )

Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Hanh Le

University of Illinois at Chicago ( email )

1200 W Harrison St
Chicago, IL 60607
United States

Hyun Song Shin

Bank for International Settlements (BIS) ( email )

Centralbahnplatz 2
Basel, Basel-Stadt 4002
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://www.bis.org/author/hyun_song_shin.htm

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
135
Abstract Views
1,866
Rank
275,167
PlumX Metrics