Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=283839
 
 

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Citations (551)



 


 



The Regulation of Entry


Simeon Djankov


London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE); Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics

Rafael La Porta


Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Florencio Lopez de Silanes


SKEMA Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Andrei Shleifer


Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

September 2001

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2953

Abstract:     
We present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 85 countries. The data covers the number of procedures, official time, and official cost that a start-up must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries with heavier regulation of entry have higher corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality of public or private goods. Countries with more democratic and limited governments have lighter regulation of entry. The evidence is inconsistent with public interest theories of regulation, but supports the public choice view that entry regulation benefits politicians and bureaucrats.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 52

Keywords: Regulation, business entry

JEL Classification: H10, K20, L50


Date posted: September 25, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Djankov, Simeon and La Porta, Rafael and Lopez de Silanes, Florencio and Shleifer, Andrei, The Regulation of Entry (September 2001). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2953. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=283839

Contact Information

Simeon Djankov (Contact Author)
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics ( email )
1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States
Rafael La Porta
Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business ( email )
Hanover, NH 03755
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Florencio Lopez de Silanes
SKEMA Business School ( email )
Campus de Lille
Avenue Willy Brandt, Euralille
Lille, 59777
France
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Andrei Shleifer
Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-5046 (Phone)
617-496-1708 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~ashleife/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Feedback to SSRN


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