52 Pages Posted: 25 Sep 2001
Date Written: September 2001
We present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 85 countries. The data covers the number of procedures, official time, and official cost that a start-up must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries with heavier regulation of entry have higher corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality of public or private goods. Countries with more democratic and limited governments have lighter regulation of entry. The evidence is inconsistent with public interest theories of regulation, but supports the public choice view that entry regulation benefits politicians and bureaucrats.
Keywords: Regulation, business entry
JEL Classification: H10, K20, L50
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Djankov, Simeon and La Porta, Rafael and Lopez de Silanes, Florencio and Shleifer, Andrei, The Regulation of Entry (September 2001). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2953. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=283839
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