The Electoral Politics of Complex Healthcare Systems

30 Pages Posted: 15 Sep 2016

See all articles by Alberto Batinti

Alberto Batinti

University of New Hampshire

Roger D. Congleton

West Virginia University - Department of Economics; George Mason University - Center for Study of Public Choice

Rinaldo Pietrantonio

West Virginia University - College of Business & Economics; Henan University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 3, 2016

Abstract

OECD countries have used a variety of mechanisms for subsidizing healthcare for more than a century. This paper demonstrates that an electoral model of healthcare policies can explain why various combinations of healthcare programs have been adopted and why they are modified through time. The analytical and empirical results suggest that income, morbidity levels, ideology, and political institutions systematically affect the composition of national healthcare systems.

Keywords: System Choice, Political Economy, Complex Healthcare Systems

JEL Classification: H11, H51, I11, I18

Suggested Citation

Batinti, Alberto and Congleton, Roger D. and Pietrantonio, Rinaldo, The Electoral Politics of Complex Healthcare Systems (August 3, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2838984 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2838984

Alberto Batinti

University of New Hampshire ( email )

15 College Road
Durham, NH 03824
United States

Roger D. Congleton (Contact Author)

West Virginia University - Department of Economics ( email )

PO Box 6025
Morgantown, WV 26506
United States

HOME PAGE: http://rdc1.net

George Mason University - Center for Study of Public Choice ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

HOME PAGE: http://rdc1.net

Rinaldo Pietrantonio

West Virginia University - College of Business & Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 6025
Morgantown, WV 26506
United States

Henan University ( email )

85 Minglun St. Shunhe
Kaifeng, Henan 475001
China

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