Preferences for Truth-Telling

121 Pages Posted: 19 Sep 2016

See all articles by Johannes Abeler

Johannes Abeler

IZA Institute of Labor Economics; University of Nottingham

Daniele Nosenzo

University of Nottingham

Collin Raymond

Amherst College

Date Written: September 2016

Abstract

Private information is at the heart of many economic activities. For decades, economists have assumed that individuals are willing to misreport private information if this maximizes their material payoff. We combine data from 72 experimental studies in economics, psychology and sociology, and show that, in fact, people lie surprisingly little. We then formalize a wide range of potential explanations for the observed behavior, identify testable predictions that can distinguish between the models and conduct new experiments to do so. None of the most popular explanations suggested in the literature can explain the data. We show that only combining a preference for being honest with a preference for being seen as honest can organize the empirical evidence.

Keywords: private information, honesty, truth-telling, lying, meta study

JEL Classification: D03, D82, H26, I13, J31

Suggested Citation

Abeler, Johannes and Nosenzo, Daniele and Raymond, Collin, Preferences for Truth-Telling (September 2016). IZA Discussion Paper No. 10188. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2840132

Johannes Abeler (Contact Author)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

University of Nottingham

University Park
Nottingham, NG8 1BB
United Kingdom

Daniele Nosenzo

University of Nottingham ( email )

University Park
Nottingham, NG8 1BB
United Kingdom

Collin Raymond

Amherst College ( email )

P.O. Box 5000
Amherst, MA 01002-5000
United States

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