Coalition-Directed Voting in Multi-Party Democracies

American Political Science Review, Vol. 104(4), November 2010

23 Pages Posted: 20 Sep 2016

See all articles by Raymond M. Duch

Raymond M. Duch

Nuffield College University of Oxford

Jeff May

University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee

Dave Armstrong

University of Oxford - Nuffield Department of Medicine

Date Written: November 01, 2010

Abstract

Ideology is widely considered to be an important factor in shaping policy outcomes and in influencing election outcomes. We propose a theory of the coalition-directed vote. The argument suggests that voters anticipate the post-election bargains negotiated among potential members of the governing coalition and that these anticipated policy agreements inform their vote choice. Our analysis, based on 86 voter preference surveys from 23 countries and over a 25-year period, confirms that coalition-directed voting occurs with considerable frequency in contexts with multiparty coalition governments.

Suggested Citation

Duch, Raymond M. and May, Jeff and Armstrong, Dave, Coalition-Directed Voting in Multi-Party Democracies (November 01, 2010). American Political Science Review, Vol. 104(4), November 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2840430

Raymond M. Duch (Contact Author)

Nuffield College University of Oxford ( email )

New Road
Oxford, OX1 1NF
United Kingdom

Jeff May

University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee ( email )

Bolton Hall 802
3210 N. Maryland Ave.
Milwaukee, WI 53211
United States

Dave Armstrong

University of Oxford - Nuffield Department of Medicine ( email )

New Road
Oxford, OX1 1NF
United Kingdom

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