Value and Epistemic Normativity
Forthcoming in Normativity and Control (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
39 Pages Posted: 23 Sep 2016
Date Written: September 19, 2016
Many writers have sought to ground epistemic normativity in the value of knowledge or truth or else in the value of successful agency. Here it is proposed that epistemic norms derive their authority from the fact that it is good for us to subject ourselves to such norms by forming beliefs. And being subject to the relevant norms may be good for us whether or not conformity to those norms is good for us. In particular, beliefs serve our interest in being subject to the norms that govern our emotions. Unless I believe that John stole my bike, whilst I can hope or fear that he did but I cannot be pleased or angry that he did. Having the capacity for this sort of emotional engagement with things that matter to us is a human good, even though we may suffer from the exercise of that capacity.
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