Mutual Persuasion

17 Pages Posted: 12 Oct 2016 Last revised: 16 Oct 2016

See all articles by Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Davide Grossi

University of Groningen

Date Written: August 30, 2016


Two agents have to collectively select one of two options. They are endowed with a personal bias, each in favor of a different option, and they observe a private signal with known quality. They then need to reveal their private signal to the other agent, but may decide to withhold some of the evidence the private signal provides, in order to persuade the other agent in the direction of their own bias. We present a Bayesian model capturing this form of persuasion. The model applies to a variety of phenomena, including political discussions, settlement negotiations and trade.

Keywords: persuasion, opinion formation, information manipulation, litigation, settlement, trade

JEL Classification: K41, D03, D83

Suggested Citation

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe and Grossi, Davide, Mutual Persuasion (August 30, 2016). Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2016-41, Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2016-03, Available at SSRN: or

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam ( email )

Postbus 15654
1001 ND
Amsterdam, Noord-Holland 1001 ND

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels

Davide Grossi

University of Groningen ( email )


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