Mutual Persuasion

17 Pages Posted: 12 Oct 2016 Last revised: 16 Oct 2016

See all articles by Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

Columbia University - Law School

Davide Grossi

University of Groningen

Date Written: August 30, 2016

Abstract

Two agents have to collectively select one of two options. They are endowed with a personal bias, each in favor of a different option, and they observe a private signal with known quality. They then need to reveal their private signal to the other agent, but may decide to withhold some of the evidence the private signal provides, in order to persuade the other agent in the direction of their own bias. We present a Bayesian model capturing this form of persuasion. The model applies to a variety of phenomena, including political discussions, settlement negotiations and trade.

Keywords: persuasion, opinion formation, information manipulation, litigation, settlement, trade

JEL Classification: K41, D03, D83

Suggested Citation

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe and Grossi, Davide, Mutual Persuasion (August 30, 2016). Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2016-41; Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2016-03. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2841160 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2841160

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Law School ( email )

435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.columbia.edu/faculty/giuseppe-dari-mattiacci

Davide Grossi

University of Groningen ( email )

Groningen
Netherlands

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