Mutual Persuasion

17 Pages Posted: 12 Oct 2016 Last revised: 16 Oct 2016

See all articles by Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

Amsterdam Law School; Amsterdam Business School; Tinbergen Institute

Davide Grossi

University of Liverpool

Date Written: August 30, 2016

Abstract

Two agents have to collectively select one of two options. They are endowed with a personal bias, each in favor of a different option, and they observe a private signal with known quality. They then need to reveal their private signal to the other agent, but may decide to withhold some of the evidence the private signal provides, in order to persuade the other agent in the direction of their own bias. We present a Bayesian model capturing this form of persuasion. The model applies to a variety of phenomena, including political discussions, settlement negotiations and trade.

Keywords: persuasion, opinion formation, information manipulation, litigation, settlement, trade

JEL Classification: K41, D03, D83

Suggested Citation

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe and Grossi, Davide, Mutual Persuasion (August 30, 2016). Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2016-41; Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2016-03. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2841160 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2841160

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci (Contact Author)

Amsterdam Law School ( email )

Nieuwe Achtergract 166
Amsterdam, 1018 WV
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://uva.nl/profile/g.darimattiacci

Amsterdam Business School ( email )

Plantage Muidergracht 12
Amsterdam, 1018TV
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://uva.nl/profile/g.darimattiacci

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://uva.nl/profile/g.darimattiacci

Davide Grossi

University of Liverpool ( email )

Chatham Street
Liverpool, L69 7ZA
United Kingdom

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
63
rank
329,048
Abstract Views
294
PlumX Metrics