Pre-Opening Period, High-Frequency Trading, and Market Quality

SAFE Working Paper No. 144

49 Pages Posted: 21 Sep 2016 Last revised: 7 Jun 2024

See all articles by Mario Bellia

Mario Bellia

European Union - JRC-Ispra, European Commision

Loriana Pelizzon

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration; Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE; Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia

Marti G. Subrahmanyam

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; NYU Shanghai

Jun Uno

Waseda University

Darya Yuferova

NHH Norwegian School of Economics - Department of Finance

Date Written: May 31, 2024

Abstract

Is the participation of High-Frequency Traders (HFTs) in the pre-opening period detrimental to market quality in the continuous trading period? Using data provided by the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) with trader identifiers, we address this question and show that only 29% of HFTs are active during the pre-opening period (Active HFTs), and the strategies employed in the continuous trading period by such Active HFTs are consistent with voluntary marketmaking. Other HFTs exhibit traits of opportunistic traders as manifested by their role in price discovery and liquidity consumption. Thus, voluntary participation of HFTs in the pre-opening period should not be discouraged.

Keywords: Pre-Opening, Opportunistic Trading, Voluntary Market-Making, High-Frequency Traders (HFTs)

JEL Classification: G12, G14

Suggested Citation

Bellia, Mario and Pelizzon, Loriana and Subrahmanyam, Marti G. and Uno, Jun and Yuferova, Darya, Pre-Opening Period, High-Frequency Trading, and Market Quality (May 31, 2024). SAFE Working Paper No. 144, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2841242 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2841242

Mario Bellia

European Union - JRC-Ispra, European Commision ( email )

Via Enrico Fermi 2749, Ispra, VA
Ispra (VA), 21027
Italy

Loriana Pelizzon (Contact Author)

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, D-60323
Germany

Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE ( email )

Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.safe-frankfurt.de

Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia ( email )

Cannaregio 873
Venice, 30121
Italy

Marti G. Subrahmanyam

New York University (NYU) - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )

44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY NY 10012
United States

NYU Shanghai ( email )

1555 Century Ave
Shanghai, 200122
China

Jun Uno

Waseda University ( email )

1-6-1 Nishi-Waseda
Shinjuku-ku
Tokyo, 1698050
Japan

Darya Yuferova

NHH Norwegian School of Economics - Department of Finance ( email )

Helleveien 30
N-5045 Bergen
Norway

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